An indigenous woman renews her carnet, her obligatory identity document, that expires every five years. After having waited the normal two hours queuing, she pays a little more than the official charge for this bureaucratic routine because the functionary promises that in that case "it will only take 8 days." After collecting her new carnet, she notices, back home, that her last name has been spelled wrong. Aware of the fact that this will produce a lot of trouble in every future bureaucratic action, she returns and queues again, only to hear that she will have to pay another amount of money to have the error corrected. She protests and claims that the mistake was made by the typist and that her name was spelled correctly on the application form (which she had to pay for) and the birth certificate (which she also had to pay for) she handed in. But the counter clerk remains deaf to her arguments and after some quarrelling transmits his impatience to the people standing behind her. Because she has no money with her, she returns home, queues again the next day, pays the amount requested (without getting a receipt, because, as the clerk explains, "she already got one the first time"), and receives her carnet seventeen days later, because the first and second time she went to pick it up, it had not been certified yet by the official in charge who was "on journey." She extensively thanks the clerk when he hands her the document.
Both these stories occurred in La Paz, Bolivia. But they could also have taken place in Quito, Bogotá, or Lima, or most any place in Latin America. What do these anecdotes tell us? From the standpoint of a U.S. or European citizen, the first thing that stands out is that both the driver and the indigenous woman did not insist on his and her right to be treated justly by state officials. The driver did not stick to demanding his rights as a driver to be properly informed about traffic ordinances to evade wrongdoing. In Europe or the United States, he probably would have won if he had taken the thing to the police station or, if necessary, to court. But he voluntarily forsook the whole universe of entitlements to proper information, to being punished only for "blamable" offences, to being exempt from abusive state functionaries, in short, to get his right. The indigenous woman did not insist on her rights as established in the procedures and did not push too hard her obvious entitlement to a free-of-charge correction. She paid for an error she did not commit. She gave in to the abusive functionary, endured queuing in vain twice, and held up a polite posture when finally handed her credential.
Although the differences might be gradual rather than total, there seems to be a greater tendency among Latin Americans to cope with obvious violations of correct treatment by representatives of the state than there would among Europeans or inhabitants of the United States or Canada. 1 It appears plausible that a different experience of citizenship is behind this readiness. The problem becomes most visible in situations as were just described. People, although strong feelings of indignation and anger might take possession of them during or after the collision, in the end opt for an alternative, and apparently ignoble, way out. It looks like they understood, during the course of their encounters 854 
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with instances that ought to endow their rights, that other strategies are more fruitful. This makes it plausible that their understanding of rights, although the concomitant official formulations might be similar with those heard in Europe or the United States, points at different contents for the same term. In this article, I concentrate on the Latin American practices of citizenship rather than on the written versions. I feel that much of the abundant recent literature on citizenship focuses on the deficiencies of the system and its institutions and on the alleged absence of citizenship awareness among the (poor) Latin Americans. Hence, a characterization in its own right of what is going on in and among these "noncitizens," and in their relations with the political sphere, remains out of sight. The framework is one of a culture in which something is absent, and the study of what is present is neglected. Missing is the attention for the way in which rank and file apply, use, and understand the terms in which the citizenship concept is usually aired. Missing is also a possible plural understanding of the contents and "sense" of concepts like politics, democracy, and citizenship. 2 In a critique on these approximations, Rosaldo asserted that we "need to understand the way citizenship is informed by culture, the way that claims to citizenship are reinforced or subverted by cultural assumptions and practices." 3 This article aims to contribute to this understanding, focusing on Bolivia, Ecuador, and Chile. 4 Setting out the argument, I suggest that what ordinary people make of citizenship has two aspects. First of all, there is, in a way, a true apocryphal side, a series of significations with respect to citizenship that reflect a lifetime of virtual nonexistence of the classic contents such as individual sovereignty, equality vis-à-vis the law, respect in treatment irrespective of family name, appearance and prestige, effective access to public positions, individual liberties, 5 and the like. What people, in such a situation, want from the system is not the full implementation of these classical contents but a somewhat better outcome of the mechanisms they actually apply. What they aim for, for instance, is a little less deceit, lying, and rudeness in the interpersonal exchanges with functionaries and "high individuals" and to receive a somewhat better treatment and outcome. This results in a series of latent as well as manifest desires that do not reflect classical contents but longed-for modifications of current practices.
At the same time, however, the notions echoing the official and legitimate rights attached to citizenship are not completely lacking. They are present in the minds of the people and influence the ways they formulate their evaluations of unpleasant experiences. People have knowledge of, and mentally apply, criteria and images about political rights, civil rights, and social rights; 6 about "decency" and transparency of the political system and politicians; about probity and decorum in exchanges with state functionaries or, for instance, local leaders and brokers. People also know that in many cases, these criteria are violated. However, they do, in their interaction with these interlocutors, not refer to these rights. They know-they have learned-that it is Salman / APOCRYPHAL CITIZENSHIP 855 counterproductive to try to oblige someone to do something for you or to allow you something because you have the right. Instead, they prefer to play according to the rules of the game, that is, imploring rather than demanding; charming rather than claiming; "relating" rather than requesting efficient, anonymous transaction. But in evaluating the state's treatment and societal manners, they denounce inequality, impunity, rudeness, political dishonesty, and their proper right-lessness, and they do so referring to the written, official citizens' entitlements. Citizenship appears to be an ambiguous notion.
However, a few conceptual matters need to be dealt with before we can enter this issue. First of all, the notion of citizenship as discussed in such a context needs more precision. According to the classical triad by Marshall, 7 the (English!) citizen conquered, in the course of history, three types of rights. Civil rights were born in the eighteenth century. They refer to the rights to individual freedom, the right to go where one pleases (and thus went against slavery, bondage, and serfdom), the right to speak one's mind, to own property, to conclude contracts, and most important, to impartial justice. These rights opposed serfdom, tyranny, censorship, compulsory state religion, and arbitrariness. The concomitant institutions are the law and the court of justice.
Political rights stem from the nineteenth century. They involve the right to participate in public, representative institutions, both as voter and as representative, and the right to associate to defend common interests. These rights counteracted the absolutist state, institutionalized elitism, restricted suffrage, and legal exclusion from functions and positions. The concomitant institutions are parliaments, councils, and other representative bodies.
Social rights are an inheritance from the twentieth century. They enclose the right to a minimal participation in national wealth and to a standard of living fitting the national standard. These rights enable the full exercise of the first two types of right. The situation these rights opposed were the socioeconomic cleft in society; the estate society; and the lack of real opportunities, chances, and state care (in education, health care, housing, etc.) for the poor masses. The institutions that embody these rights are the welfare state and the national education, housing, and health systems.
Clearly, Marshall's scheme does not seamlessly fit Latin America's history or present. Nevertheless, it serves as a heuristic device to sensitize ourselves for certain aspects of the (in)existence of rights. 8 Also, it formed the basis under the articulation in recent years of a "fourth dimension" of rights, the collective or ethnic rights. 9 Furthermore, it served and still serves as a tool to analyze where and how these rights have not, or only half-heartedly, or in a different order, been established. 10 Additionally, and more important, in combination with the argument about "deviating" understandings of citizenship, it makes us realize that there exists a crucial complementary dimension to any theoretical elaboration of rights or citizenship. The whole issue only makes sense if and when people have some knowledge and awareness of these rights and, if necessary, make state institutions, or other actors and resorts, apply them. Clearly, warranting these rights in constitutions and legislation, as is the case in Latin American countries, is not enough or the central issue; and dealing with them only in legalistic or stipulative modes makes the whole thing clueless. The formal existence of citizens'rights has to be complemented by an active notion and attitude of being entitled to enjoy these rights or of being entitled to enjoy a particular form of them. The attitude of citizenship, then, has to be learned to make it happen-either "righteously" or deviatingly. It seems to be in this dimension of internalization of a special self-esteem as citizen that the problem can be located.
11
As was illustrated at the outset, this comes to the fore most explicitly in encounters between state functionaries and the citizen in his condition of state subject.
12
It also becomes manifest in the ways people approach "politics" to obtain certain benefits or simply the application of official rights.
I will concentrate on the two cases just mentioned: bureaucratic encounters and the ways the urban poor 13 (in Quito, Santiago, and La Paz) approach "politics" to get things done for their neighborhood.
14 This means that I will focus mainly upon the civil rights-the rights referring to the respect, liberties, impartial treatment, and equality the citizen is entitled to; and to a lesser degree upon political rights, particularly the right to participation and influence in the political realm. As these rights, in Marshall's view, 15 are the foundation for the other ones (although not their precondition; rather, the three presuppose each other to be effective), their truncated realization would definitely affect the degree in which the other two are feasible.
The point, of course, is not only to avoid the top-down discussion and replace it with addressing how ordinary people live secluded from "the law." Rather, the claim is to discuss how the presence of the law echoes in the ways people manage themselves in these types of situations and how they feel about their rights. As will be illustrated, the issue is not one of incompatibilities but of subtle permeation of official and nonofficial forms of "rights." The focus in this discussion will therefore only be on some facets of civil and political rights and less on the dimension of social rights or on the concept of citizenship per se.
The importance of such a perspective is, I think, that if we want to make sense of currently changing conditions with regard to citizenship, including the impacts of globalization; "the information society"; and the reactions to current-day social movements', politicians', and international bodies' insistence on rights and political transparency, we need to deepen our comprehension of the previous trajectories the subjects embodying these changes went through. 16 The current literature will briefly be reviewed and commented upon. Subsequently, the presence of the absence of citizenship among the urban poor in Latin America will be discussed, in two separate steps. First the focus will be upon the specific contents-and deviations-of notions and practices with regard to rights, entitlements, identities, liberties, and sovereignty, all crucial terms in both classic and current theorizing on citizenship. Second, the Salman / APOCRYPHAL CITIZENSHIP 857 presence, in spite of the apparent opposite, of classic and "canonical" criteria of citizenship 17 will be addressed, as these surface in common people's views and judgments about the deeds and misdeeds of politicians and state functionaries-a presence, as will be illustrated, which is not translated into practices in the encounters with these latter actors, but which functions as ethical and normative standard informing evaluations and current learning processes. The final section attempts to synthesize some of the findings.
THE PREDOMINANT FOCUS ON "ABSENCE" OF CITIZENSHIP
In many publications on the insufficient bearing of the citizen, the democratic deficiencies of both old and regained democracies in Latin America have been highlighted. 18 Problems detected (and sometimes discussed in terms of current efforts to overcome them) are the fragility of the regained and notyet consolidated democracies 19 and the incapacity or unwillingness of political institutions to represent societal interests, identities, and diversity. 20 Others have focused upon the lack of interaction and dialogue between society and governments 21 or the overideologized or, in recent times, overopportunistic party specter. the lack of state maneuvering due to neoliberal impositions and globalization, 27 the persisting predominance of authoritarianism, 28 the legacy of a culture of negation of the "other" as an explanation for the failure of citizenship to materialize, 29 the absence of a culture of rights, 30 and the neoliberal usurpation cum impoverishment of the citizenship concepts' contents. 31 All these features, it is argued, result in a crippled practice of citizenship.
The bulk of the literature thus focuses upon the incompleteness of the process of nation-building and the inadequacy and immaturity of democratic practices. In this view Latin America, in many respects, is not (yet) "rational"; its societies are not yet being based on the individual sovereignty, on equality in the valorization of the individual, and on civic-normative cultures. 32 These societies are not (yet) "mature" enough to establish "decent" democracies, stable and ideologically consistent party systems, and impersonal bureaucratic practices.
However, this whole tradition of dealing with the issues of democracy and citizenship leads to analyses that tend to be teleological, normative, and anthropologically poor. 33 The focus mostly is upon the deficient institutionality, highlighting its fragileness, its incapacity or reluctance to apply the same rules to anybody, its lack of probity, and its vulnerability to a logic of small-circle-loyalty instead of complying with a logic of common good. 34 In other cases, analyses focus upon political culture, highlighting the vices of authoritarianism, elitism, clientelism, nepotism, populism, corruption, and prebendalism, declaring all those cultural traits premodern. Especially in this latter tendency, political culture tends to be conceptualized as a universe in which the democratic order "as it should function" is permanently derailed by practices that corrupt it and rob it of its legitimacy and true democratic vocation. Culture, thus, appears as the obstacle, the phenomenon that blocks the democracy from functioning as it should.
All this leads to the detection of a long list of deficiencies: to a scarce participation, to a weak civil society in which the citizen is practically absent, 35 to political systems that are "irrational" 36 and incorporate an "authoritarian manipulative ingredient" 37 or even are marked by an "engrained authoritarian tradition . . . and an oligarchic configuration of politics in daily praxis." 38 At a societal level, the deficiencies are that these are politically disarticulated, hardly trust in or are interested in politics, 39 are "abstentionalist and antiparty," 40 and in alarming numbers incline to authoritarian rule. 41 
POLITICAL CULTURE AND CITIZENSHIP DOWN UNDER
The ways in which poor neighborhoods fight for the deliverance of urban services reveal that a citizens rights discourse is rarely applied. This becomes clear listening to both common shantytown settlers and their neighborhood dirigentes. One can often hear the latter paying verbal tribute to the discourse on rights, their entitlements as citizens and due obligations of governments and municipalities. But as one learns about how they actually operate to obtain benefits for their neighborhoods, it becomes clear that it is mere discourse. In practically all cases concerning the acquisition of certain obras (works) for their vicinity, hardly ever was the insistence on legal criteria, or on accredited entitlements, a central part of the strategy. Rather, the story is about "asking for help." Neighborhood representatives go to the municipality, or its technical and executive bodies, and try to obtain access to the person "who is in charge." To this person they explain the problem and ask for help. Most often, this person attempts to duck the responsibility for a decision on the matter, and the representatives' quality, in such cases, lies in his ability to get access to the "higher" level. Often neighborhood leaders would boast about their astuteness in managing to "get through" to the people who really could take decisions and/or warrant that the promises would actually be observed. In cases the dirigentes failed to get the "works" done, they would most often explain this failure in terms of "I couldn't get to the guy who is really in charge" or "they wouldn't let me talk to the person who could take the decision." All these narratives were in terms of access, friends, relations, and cogency, and hardly ever did the vocabulary appear that refers to regulations and stipulations being obeyed, to "rights being applied," or to "norms being observed."
The gap between the rights discourse and ordinary peoples' narratives of how things work is even greater. In more than fifty interviews realized in Ecuador and Chile in the years 1996 and 1997-which focused on neighborhood organizations-informants hardly ever referred to impersonal rights. Barrio histories, stories on organization, victories, vicissitudes of dealing with politicians and on how certain things were accomplished, were always stories about concrete people: leaders, local politicians, individuals who took initiatives or knew the right people, intermediaries such as representatives of the church or respected elderly. Reconstructions of how things were done, how the neighborhood "got this far," lacked major allusions to the law, to municipal rules and edicts, and to the process of navigating through juridical formulations and its mazes. Exceptions were neighborhoods that originally were land seizures. In these cases, juridical stipulations and parameters were hinted at. However, in telling the story about how things finally were settled, once again the role of certain politicians and intermediaries came to the fore. The degree in which the final agreement did or did not observe the law, or the squatters' rights, or the legislation, was never part of the account people gave. Thus, even in cases in which the strife had an obvious juridical component, and in which the rights of the squatters and of the landowner beyond doubt must have been part and parcel of the negotiations and final compromise, the average squatter did not include the rights discourse in his or her tale about "how it went."
Personal relations thus play a larger role than notions about rights as citizens and inhabitants of the city. But in what ways, then, is the "traditional" content of citizenship altered? The formulations used by the informants point at two ways in which this occurs.
First, the "existence" of official and formal citizenship takes place in a universe that is not common people's main life domain. References to the right of free speech, of religious liberty, of association, or to the rights to access and to representation in governmental bodies, and so forth, mean relatively little to people whose first worries are the lack of stable income, precarious housing and neighborhood conditions, school necessities for their children, and the illmannered behavior of counter clerks needed to obtain, for instance, a birth certificate. The most acute feelings of anxiety and insecurity in daily life and the most pressing problems are not those covered by the citizens rights tenets or those debated over in constitutional reforms. Official citizens rights are a "big" thing; people's daily experiences take place in "small" dailyness.
This perception culminates in incidental and particular rather than fundamental or aggregate demands from "the system." The wish for a more decent functioning of present routines is much more close and relevant than the abstract claim to "fully install" all legal rights. What people concretely want is clemency in their particular case, decency from the part of the state's counter clerks, being listened to when they explain their problem, the freedom to choose a cheaper alternative for the cloth prescribed for the school uniform, 860 JOURNAL OF URBAN HISTORY / September 2004 the absolving of their traffic ticket by an understanding police officer in case they are not blamable, the abolition of the arbitrariness to cut an hour of their work pay when they arrived three minutes late, and the like. Instead of striving for the installment and application of their prerogatives as citizens, they look for a more "understanding," benevolent, and flexible treatment and the liberation of the indiscriminations they daily have to cope with. Legalistic emphases in talking about claimants' rights do not meet people's most stressing worries and perceptions of their worries. Second, an important aspect is the auto-exclusion from the domain of legal regulations, formal ruling, and most public and political space. Given strong traditions of elitism, of relatively low schooling levels for the majority, and of the still strong remains of a hierarchical estate society, great majorities of the Latin Americans consider politics; legislation; and the world of statutes, jurisdiction, procedural resolutions, regulations, and the whole of legal terminology a hostile, inaccessible, and unfathomable world in which they are illiterates. They, under normal circumstances, would not dare to dispute the impositions of the personal in charge in that world. Vis-à-vis claims of anyone referring to articles, clauses, and paragraphs with regard to a particular bureaucratic procedure-or right or restriction of a right-they would mostly remain silent no matter how illogical or silly the claim would be. It simply is a "noenter" land, a domain of public rule impervious to "our sort of public." Much the same goes for politics. Rogelio expresses this auto-limitation, although he also makes a point of the fact that "in principle" things ought to be different (as will be elaborated in the next section):
Poor people . . . could make a difference and could influence things . . . if only they had access, and were prepared . . . if one studies one would understand what they from above are venting upon us all the time. (Rogelio, Quito, October 30, 1998) Besides, as all too often expressed in informal conversations with Latin Americans, being considered a world of thieves and impostors, "politics" (and, for that matter, the judiciary) also is considered a world where many dangers lurk if one is not acquainted with the rules. Politicians (and lawyers), people feel, are a sly race, and uninformed people should not get mixed up in their bickering if they do not want to get hurt. As a result, common people tend to stay out of the domains where their rights are formulated and defended, and ought to be protected. The places where their rights, as official rights, are at stake and where they theoretically might find support for their complaints about actual rightlessness, are exactly the places they feel they do not have a trespassing permit.
This results in the felt obligation to leave in the hands of the politicians the things they are least willing and able to do: legislate and participate in society according to the laws agreed upon in Parliament. Talking about the evil of the Salman / APOCRYPHAL CITIZENSHIP 861 need for personal relationships to get things done, and how to get rid of it, Paquisha paradoxically transfers her proper responsibility immediately to the politicians, and takes it in her stride to disqualify them. So does, very categorically, Pía, whereas Octavio expresses some frustration but at the same time resignation with regard to the politicians' ways of "keeping people out."
To change things, to get rid of these palanca-things . . . well, those in Congress have to take the initiative . . . they are the padres de la patria [fathers of the fatherland], as they say . . . but they themselves must act according to a sort of "order" they should respect, one as well as the other . . . there are many bad apples there too . . . meanwhile, all we can do is work hard and honestly. All this results in specific modalities of promoting one's interest, which often do not concur with citizens' legal and politically official modes. Instead of recurring to forms such as formal interest representation in the municipal councils, of having one's demand brought to the attention through due application forms or if necessary through parliamentary questions, or of forming civil interest groups and the like, people often opt for informal, clientelistic, or, more recently, at times mass media-centered forms to get their grievances heard. They do not feel comfortable with legal and formal vocabularies and protest channels, and they abstain from participating or expressing opinions in such terms. Relations, patronazco, votes-negotiations, and loud, short-lived media scandals have proved much more effective, and are things people feel more familiarized with, than going the way of the formal anonymous defense of rights. 42 Often, such "detour" tactics result in partial or short-term solutions, not in a more systematic attention for underprivileged neighborhoods or deprived groups, nor in them being attended according to their citizens rights.
These two aspects result in a presence of citizenship in which prevail particularism and ad hoc demands about rights application. Moreover, people value passive, beneficiary rights-as-grants above active, participatory rights, and auto-exclude themselves with regard to the deliberations on right formulations and claims. At first sight, such qualities deny the very essence of the idea of citizens rights. But at a closer look, they reveal how people manage apocryphal fragments of something they cannot have entirely, or "the ambiguity and indeterminateness of practices and representations manufactured out of the Demands and wishes do not reflect the final goal or "the whole thing" but the pieces within image-reach. They express the sensation of the insufficient public visibility of the status of citizens in the realm of experiences, in relation to the legal rationality of these societies. 44 This "legal rationality" is not completely absent from the assessment of reality, as will be argued below. But to get about, this standard is rather irrelevant. This is expressed by Pedro, and sarcastically commented upon by Armando (in his case with regard to performing bureaucratic obligations):
We of course hold on to it that we have the same rights as citizens as the rich . . . but in actual fact they have privileges . . . when they approach the authorities . . . well, they are the señores and we . . . let's just say that they [the authorities] see us on a little lower level. (Pedro, Quito, September 9, 1996) What is the use of arguing with him [the state employee]? If he is in a bad mood, he won't help you anyway. You can only hope he had good sex that morning with his wife, so that he is in a good mood. Then he might help you. But it is no use to argue, that's for sure. The lack of references to the universe of established rights and to the due obligations of the state and its employees is even more remarkable, as illustrates Armando, when nonpolitical, ordinary encounters and affairs such as bureaucratic formalities are the theme of the narrative. People often meet with slight; poor infrastructure; hours-long waiting; and peevish, arrogant, and fickle employees, and because of this, paradoxically, give more importance to relations than to arguments about how rights ought to be complied with. This suggests that the perception of rights being violated is not a thing discursively present all the time but rather a latent evaluation pattern. People object, but this objection is not put to action. This mixture of latent negative judgment and daily coping is expressed by María:
The rich have their palancas at all places, they have their friends everywherethey get out quickly [of official buildings and offices], whereas we don't have these friendships . . . for us it takes long, you have to queue, they send you from one place to the other . . . you just have to have patience. (María, Quito, September 24, 1996) Here, to get your taxi-permit renewed, it really is a calvario. They let you wait for hours, and always say some document is not in order. In daily doing, then, people do not turn to a proactive claim of citizenship standards and concomitant rights and express almost resignation with regard to how things for them transpire. The word almost is necessary: it is not that people are not aware of the "wrong" (as will be elaborated below), but the thing is Salman / APOCRYPHAL CITIZENSHIP 863 that they see absolutely no point in protesting recurring to "their right." In daily interaction, such behavior would not only produce derision or irritation among the ones who are denying decent, appropriate treatment, but also wonder among those who share the protestor's lot. It is an unrealistic, atypical resource, and does not form part of the normal defense repertoire against the insecurity and capriciousness that besets them.
Consequently, the inability to claim rights is not easily undone by inserting knowledge about these rights. The daily reproductions of relations that contradict individuals' (citizens') equality resist fast refashioning. They are not only continuously reconfirmed by how the institutions and politics work but are also deeply embedded in people's reactions and responses. People's action, in the words of Lois McNay, entails "entrenched dimensions of embodied experiences that might escape processes of reflexive self monitoring." In the view of McNay, it is crucial to understand such identities (in her case gender identities) not as the result of a "relatively straightforward and one-sided process of inculcation and normalisation" but as both a "relation of conditioning" as well as of a "relation of 'cognitive construction' whereby habitus is constitutive of the field in that it endows the latter with meaning, with 'sense and value,' in which it is worth investing one's energy." 45 This Bourdieu-inspired vocabulary, if we apply it to poor urban Latin Americans' citizen identities, reveals that not a mere repression of citizen awareness or a "reparable" lack of consciousness is at stake, but that, rather, a creative and at times clever exploitation of predominant features combines with abstaining from the demand to be treated, formally, "righteously."
Often, these clerks are badly prepared for their job. They work there because they know the boss, that's all. Sometimes you can take advantage of them. For instance, you say that the other week you arranged the same matter with the same papers at hand. If you're lucky, they believe you. (Militón, La Paz, March 2000)
HOW IT OUGHT TO BE: HOW UNWORKABLE STANDARDS WORK
Latin American urban poor manage their own, apocryphal contents and priorities with regard to practicing citizenship. At the same time, however, as already alluded to in the previous section, notions about rights that do reflect the creed of official citizens prerogatives are not completely lacking in their images. Most people are well aware of how they should be treated as citizens, of how politicians and government functionaries ought to behave, and of how institutions must be run. The presence of notions of due politics, due institutionality, and due citizenship thus turns out a little more than just formal or abstract. Latin American societies, it seems, operate "at the juncture of a system composed of ideal norms and a legitimising system of social practices based on personal relations." 46 The "ideal norms" are not completely inactive. With regard to the issue of clientelism and the corresponding views on politics and politicians, the point is well illustrated by Burgwal. 47 He argues, referring to the practices in a Quitenean squatter settlement, that many dwellers in a way accept the rules of the clientelistic game, and might in their explanations refer to the logic of give and take (give electoral support, take/receive benefits for their neighborhood), and to the image of a generous politician that deserves gratitude. They will, in their encounters with such politicians, even treat these with deference and stress the politicians' power of disposal and their own dependency and role as recipients. Nevertheless, underneath the verbal submission, criteria crop up about what is correct. It is clearly, although not always explicitly, expressed that, for instance, existing patronazco relations should not be patronizing or work out as narrow collusions; and more in general, criteria to distinguish good and bad politicians surface. 48 In these criteria about good politicians, it is stressed that these politicians should be indifferent toward whom they are helping (they should focus upon the common good without considering friends, foes, and clans), and their plainness and sensitivity toward the needs of the poor are particularly valued. The not narrowly partisan politician, frank and honest, competent and not sectarian, who serves others rather than himself, in other words, the politician supposed to be prototypical for the "consolidated and mature democracy," thus emerges as the model politician the urban poor dream of. The rejection of the practices of arbitrary clientelism also becomes present when this politician fails to deliver. In such cases, the shantytown dwellers might recur to open protest and even insults toward politicians, accusing them of exactly those things that in the first instance were the vehicles of the clientelist negotiating: particularism, unreliability, "payola-politics," and unscrupulous maneuvering and politicking. Hence, not only latent awareness, but also practices that recur to notions of rights and correct politics, are at times present, simultaneously with concepts that reflect acceptation of and adaptation to routines that invalidate these notions. Identities with regard to citizenship are multifarious. They include both practices apparently revealing a lack of awareness of rights and of the notions about the correct appliance of these rights in a constitutional democracy, and a presence of cognizance about how things ought to be.
In a sort of "negative dialectics," the arguments with which the lack of decent treatment and the revolting behavior of politicians in the view of the poor are indicted reveal the not often directly articulated criteria that according to them ought to govern.
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Often there are people in there that are not at all prepared for the job. I personally feel that when they get in there they should give them a course in "human relations," because most of them don't know about that or don't apply it. You get into this office, and the secretary is polishing her nails, talking with the other secretary, o taking a coffee-and the people are waiting there in long queues. So one says: "señorita, please" . . . so it gets to the point when someone gets angry and says: "why don't you do what you are supposed to do, and attend these people?" So she says: "because I don't feel like it, or this is my break" and her break really is all day long. And if the jefe [the superior] comes in, and he put her there, even worse it gets. He shakes hands with her and gets out again . . . or the superior comes in and they write three or four letters on the computer and . . . over and out! That really is one easy thing that could be done in this country: that everybody working there would be prepared and willing to work. If we could only do that, we wouldn't be the way we are. (Leonidas, Quito, September 4, 1997) People are aware that they should be treated otherwise, that they, officially, have the right to complain about arbitrariness and rudeness, that they have the right to express their anger. People, in a way think with citizen rights.
Things are really bad here. Nothing works. Not even the traffic lights. And "up there" they steal and lie, nothing else. And there is nothing to be done about it. What we need is decent and honest politicians, that do something for this country. Why don't some of your country come and help us out here? (Taxi driver, La Paz, May 2000)
However, this rights cognizance is not applied as an instrument to solicit one's right in concrete situations; it is present more as an image than as a practical tool. This ambiguity can help explain why the notion of rights is welcomed and referred to in stories about (experiences with) politicians and state bureaucracy and, at the same time, is left behind in concrete encounters. 49 To recognize or denounce (but never vis-à-vis state officials!) events of not being attended, or not being attended properly, or being treated badly, or being "abandoned" by politics, the notion of citizenship works for people. However, in concrete situations, they tend to fill in the idea with much more bare notions such as the wish to be lucky and be (correctly) attended in a particular case, and to receive fair and "delivering" treatment, irrespective of its "equality" quality. People, in this way, reproduce the ambiguity and interrelatedness of un-citizen-like practices and citizens' consciousness.
"There is . . . an apparently strong and very 'Western' support for a liberal concept of political and bureaucratic probity, and this in turn seemed to be closely linked to a modern and liberal concept of citizenship rights." 50 Citizenship acquires not only a specific stature in the sense that it works more as a moral code than as a practical wedge to open up state institutions or gain access to decisions on policies and to obtain efficient reply at state offices, but also in the sense that in make-do life it is fleshed out with exactly those qualities most Whereas, on one hand, in concrete evaluations and considerations around politics, people "are not interested in ideology, ideas, principles, methods and objectives, but (only) in realizations," on the other hand, there is enormous trust in the law. 51 The law represents order and due organization of things; it represents "the same rule for everybody" and embodies the promise of deliverance if the applicant complies with the (bureaucratic) prerequisites. Politicians and people with power do not go by the law, and that is exactly the problem.
52
A self-identifying mechanism often observed among rank-and-file Latin Americans is that of grouping oneself with "the decent people." Poverty, unemployment, a shack for a house, all these things might apply to these people. Nonetheless the criterion of decency remains upheld. Decent are those that obey the elementary rules of coexistence with others: do not steal, do not lie, do not be pretentious, do not cheat others, respect others. This attitude obtains extra significance in the light of the fact that most people agree that their country does not live up to these virtues. In a way, they set the example: if everybody, especially politicians and state representatives, would behave as decently as they, the rank and file, do, their country would not be such a mess.
Our people are so credulous . . . they let themselves being cheated time and again. They [politicians], talk so nicely, and have such a nice face, so the people say: "all right, let's forgive him what he's done before." It looks as if the people are too meek, they fall again and again . . . always for the same guys, that this time seem to have bettered themselves. So the people say: "this one, let's see what he will realise this time" . . . We Ecuadorians are too understanding . . . but a good thing is that we [the poor] are often solidary, although not all . . . but the majority is willing to help the other guy, they smile towards the other, and are at his service. (Leonidas, Quito, September 4, 1997) A double scenario is at work, in which, nevertheless, the standard of decency is not given up. Both in explaining and excusing their own maneuvering as well as in judging others' behavior, the model is alive of a decent society, where rights are respected, dignity is endowed to all, and probity guides human interaction. People know about rights and citizens' entitlements. They think with it. But it would be folly on their part to try to employ these rights in real life.
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BY WAY OF CONCLUSION
In a burlesque tone, Escalante, speaking of Mexico, mocks the obtuse citizen:
The citizen goes about applying little logic and with an awkward lack of practical sense. For instance, everybody knows that it is much better for our health and peacefulness of mind to simply pay the payola to whomever is entitled, and forget about the thing as soon as possible. The citizen, however, either simply doesn't know, or pretends not to know, and once he gets into it, he doesn't pay neither forgets about it, neither lives on peacefully, neither allows the others to do so; he can take months in complaints and denunciations, writing letters and accusations . . . ; (really) one needs a good nose to distinguish him from the lout or simple idiot. 53 In his parody, Escalante goes as far as to call him a pain in the neck for not smoothly going by the rules of the game. He is probably right, in the sense that most Latin Americans do not insist on probity, politeness, and efficiency in daily dealing with state dependencies and politics. To do otherwise would be unproductive and would most likely evoke advice from others to do otherwise and, in case of insistence, their repulse.
What people make of citizenship in cases when the sociocultural foundations for the existence of its classical orthodoxy do not apply is something apt for the circumstances. It looks as if, first and for all, people appreciate being attended. Rights, in their conception, refer less to their access to participation, proactive action, initiative to intervene, or personal lifestyle freedom but to their entitlement, interpreted as a particular, not universal, thing to be addressed properly by the state and by the state's policies. "Rights" thus refer to the "delivering," honorable, and decent operation of the practices embodying their dependence on higher powers, the state in the first place. 54 The right to have a say, to get elected, to join in deliberations about policies, is less a worry than is the right to get something. A passive contents of citizenship predominates over one in which the "sovereign individual" rules. Citizenship is more about being treated than about acting. And it is more about people's attitudes than about societal structures and legislation. 55 This translates into an emphasis on being beneficiaries more than on being bequeathed access to active involvement and membership in societal institutions and political bodies. Citizenship is associated less with formal equality in the right to partake than with concretely being considered in measures taken, benefits being distributed, and bureaucratic formalities being dispatched.
This indifference regarding the active participation as part and parcel of "mature citizenship" (a great worry for Jelín and for Calderón and Zmuckler 56 ), in the "collective will" to help the country forward, probably echoes the feelings of being incompetent in the joint endeavor "of the country," and this in turn echoes the lifelong history of effective exclusion. For many Latin Americans, "legislation" is done elsewhere. But to overcome the vocabulary of "absence" or insufficiency of citizenship, it is crucial to highlight the way these experiences are transformed into practices, resignifications, and strategies that enable people to move ahead and become agents in an engraved civil-agency-unfriendly culture. Latin Americans' focus upon favors and benefits does not stand for passivity or "absence" but for active, creative, and flexible handling of citizen-adverse conditions.
Simultaneously, the notion of due citizenship is present and used in assessing experiences. In such assessments, institutions'functioning and politicians' behavior fall short of the standard. The standard, in turn, interlinks with practices that reveal a self-restricting, dependent, public-space-avoiding citizen, who is, however, at the same time, cunning in managing the conditions under which his citizenship is allowed to be.
In recent decades, sociopolitical circumstances in Latin America have undergone dramatic changes. The scant welfare structure crumbled under the restructuring measures, and the obligation of the state "to take care" evaporated from political discourses. 57 On the other hand, global discourses on transparency and good governance, and the rejection of the history of authoritarianism, gained in strength. They match with an increasing critique on the flaws of existing democratic structures, and with a reorientation of the traditional Left attributing democracy and citizenship unprecedented vigor. All this has given the idea of citizenship central stage in current Latin American political contestation. However, if we hope to understand the ways in which common Latin Americans will react to these changing political parameters, we first of all need to comprehend what they used to make of citizenship given the past trajectories of their countries.
